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DUE PROCESS PROTECTION EXTENDED TO PRISONERS APPLYING FOR
CONDITIONAL RELEASE
Zurak v. Regan
Modern legal thought no longer embraces the view that an indi-
vidual is deprived of all constitutional rights upon being convicted
of a crime and sentenced to prison.' Courts have gradually recog-
nized that inmates retain such essential rights as religious freedom,
humane treatment, and access to the courts.2 The Supreme Court
has expanded the due process rights of convicted felons by mandat-
ing that certain procedural safeguards be provided in the parole
revocation process.3 Before parole may be validly revoked, a parolee
must be given a written statement of his alleged violations, in-
formed of the evidence to be used against him, and afforded an
opportunity to appear personally and establish a defense. Upon
' Illustrative of the historical view that prisoners forfeited their constitutional rights is
the decision in Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871). There, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a prisoner who had committed a crime need not stand
trial where the crime was committed. The court observed that such a holding did not violate
the constitutional requirement that an accused be tried in his vicinage since "It]he bill of
rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society of freemen, and not of convicted
felons and men civilly dead." Id. at 796.
2 See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (prisoner who claimed prison
authorities did not permit him to practice his religious beliefs stated a valid cause of action
for which judicial relief was available); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam)
(segregation of prisoners by race violates the fourteenth amendment); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S.
546 (1941) (prison officials may not deny prisoner the right to apply to the courts for a writ
of habeas corpus); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (placing nude prisoner in
solitary confinement without sanitary facilities and with an open window in subfreezing
weather consitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786
(M.D. Tenn. 1969) (extreme unsanitary conditions in unventilated, unlighted, and unfur-
nished dry cell in which prisoner was placed without clothing violates the Constitution);
Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79
HAsv. L. REV. 635 (1965).
1 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972). In response to the Morrissey decision,
the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974) altered its earlier position
and held that certain minimal due process safeguards also are required in the initial parole-
granting process. Previously, the Second Circuit in Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971), had held that the due process clause did not
apply to parole proceedings. The Johnson court distinguished Menechino, finding that in the
latter the defendant had argued for the full "panoply of due process rights," including the
right to counsel and a fair hearing. 500 F.2d at 928. In Johnson, on the other hand, the
plaintiff merely requested a statement of reasons for the denial of his parole. Id. at 926. Thus,
the denial of due process protection in Menechino was considered by the Johnson court to be
only a rejection of the contention that due process in the parole situation requires a full
complement of procedural protection. Id. at 927-28. For a brief discussion of Johnson, see
Gurfein, The Federal Courts Look at Parole, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 223, 233-38 (1975).
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revocation of parole, the individual must be furnished a statement
delineating the reasons for and the evidence considered in rendering
the decision.' A number of federal courts, relying upon this Supreme
Court authority, have extended due process protection to inmates
being considered for parole release.5 Recently, in Zurak v. Regan,,
the Second Circuit was called upon to determine whether the proce-
dural safeguards emanating from the due process clause also should
be afforded to individuals seeking conditional release, an early dis-
charge mechanism for prisoners serving a definite sentence of less
than one year.7 Determining that conditional release is analogous to
parole release, the Second Circuit held that the operation of the
conditional release process is circumscribed by certain due process
requirements.' Specifically, the court declared that inmates incar-
cerated at Rikers Island Correctional Facility who apply for condi-
tional release must be processed in order of eligibility, within 60 to
90 days of arrival at the institution.' In addition, the Second Circuit
held that although a personal appearance before the parole board
is not constitutionally required, the applicant must be provided
with a written explanation should his conditional release request be
denied or deferred.'0
The Zurak plaintiffs, six inmates serving sentences of more
than 90 days and less than 1 year at Rikers Island Correctional
Facility, instituted a class action in federal district court on behalf
of all prisoners actually or potentially eligible for conditional re-
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972).
United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 914 (1976); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Johnson v. Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom.
Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); see note 52 infra.
550 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.40(2) (McKinney 1975) provides in pertinent part:
A person who is serving one or more than one definite sentence of imprisonment
with a term or aggregate term in excess of ninety days may, if he so requests, be
conditionally released from the institution in which he is confined at any time after
service of sixty days of that term, exclusive of credits allowed under subdivisions
four and six of section 70.30.
In New York, definite sentences are imposed for Class A, Class B, and unclassified
misdemeanors as well as violations. See id. § 70.15. Additionally, a person who is sentenced
for a Class D, E or other enumerated felony and is not a second or persistent offender, may
at the discretion of the court be sentenced to a definite sentence if it is believed that an
indeterminate sentence would result in undue harshness. See id. § 70.00(4) (McKinney 1975
& Supp. 1977-1978). Definite sentences may not exceed one year. Id.
550 F.2d at 93.
Id. at 89.
,0 Id. at 95.
" Id. at 90. The class was authorized to proceed by the district court pursuant to FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). 550 F.2d at 90. Additionally, the district court granted appellees' post-
1978]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:252
lease." Judicial intervention was sought to remedy alleged inade-
quacies in the conditional release decisional process.' 2 In particular,
the plaintiffs alleged that New York's failure to afford conditional
release applicants the procedural safeguards provided parolees' 3
violated the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal pro-
tection.' 4 Finding that the procedure employed in administering the
conditional release program was "chaotic," 5 the district court held
that, under the due process clause, applicants must be processed in
order of eligibility within a specified time period, and supplied with
a statement of reasons for the parole board's determination. 6 In
addition, the lower court concluded that upon the denial of the
conditional release request, applicants must be afforded an oppor-
tunity to appear personally before the parole board.' 7
On appeal, the Second Circuit addressed the threshold question
whether an inmate's interest in conditional release is sufficient to
require procedural due process protection.'8 The Second Circuit
trial motion to include in the class those prisoners who were transferred from Rikers Island
but were still serviced by that institution's parole staff. This increased the class by approxi-
mately 100 to 200 inmates. Id. at 90 n.4. By the time the case reached the Second Circuit,
the plaintiffs who had instituted the action had been released from Rikers Island. Id. at 90
n.3; see note 19 infra.
," 550 F.2d at 90.
13 Id.
" Id. at 90.
"5 Id. at 90 n.5. In order to be considered for conditional release, an inmate first must be
interviewed by a parole officer. At the time of the Zurak action, however, these interviews
were granted on a random basis without regard to the amount of time the prisoner had been
incarcerated. Id. at 90-91. Additionally, there existed no guidelines delineating the manner
in which the interviews were to be conducted. Id. at 90. On the basis of the interview and
the information contained in the inmate's pre-sentence file, the parole officer would prepare
a report which would be placed in the file and sent to the commissioner of the parole board.
Id. at 91. The parole board would consider this report in deciding whether to grant conditional
release. Demonstrative of the system's inadequacies is the testimony of one individual who
had applied for conditional release upon his arrival at Rikers Island but had not yet received
an interview 8 months later. Id. at 90 n.5. Other witnesses testified that a period of 3 to 4
months had lapsed before they were informed of the denial of their applications. Id.
11 Id. at 89. In September, 1975, the parole board began to provide applicants who had
been denied conditional release a statement of reasons and facts. Prior to this time, an inmate
whose application had been denied was not given an explanation. Id. at 91.
,7 Id. at 89.
Id. at 92. Prior to discussing the merits of the case, the Second Circuit disposed of the
contention that the release of all the original plaintiffs from prison had rendered the action
moot. While noting that under ordinary circumstances a plaintiff must be a member of the
relevant class at the time the class is certified, id. at 91 (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402-03 (1975)), the court found that the present action fit within one of the "suitable
exception[s]" to that requirement. 550 F.2d at 91 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
110-11 n.11 (1975)). Under this exception, an issue capable of evading review may nonetheless
be decided even though the controversy has been resolved with respect to the original plain-
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majority, in an opinion authored by Judge Lumbard,9 relied on its
earlier decision in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Board of Parole,20
which held that a prisoner's interest in parole release is within the
scope of the due process clause.21 Judge Lumbard reasoned that the
nature of the inmate's interest in conditional release and parole
release is identical: "'conditional freedom versus incarceration.' ",22
The court therefore concluded that the due process clause has appli-
cation to the conditional release process. 23
Having decided that due process protection is warranted, the
Second Circuit next considered the specific type of procedures con-
stitutionally required. In making this determination, Judge Lum-
bard looked to the three factors identified by the Supreme Court as
relevant in determining the procedural safeguards necessary to sat-
isfy due process: the individual interest involved; the possible dan-
ger of "erroneous deprivation" under the current procedures; and
the effect that a change in the procedures would have on the public
interest, taking into consideration the additional financial and ad-
ministrative expenditures required to implement the additional
safeguards.24 Weighing the relative interests of the applicant for
tiffs. 550 F.2d at 91-92. The Zurak panel found that, due to the brief periods of imprisonment
involved, the exception was applicable to the instant action. Id.
" The majority consisted of Judge Lumbard and District Judge Bonsal of the Southern
District of New York. Judge Van Graafeiland concurred in part and dissented in part in a
separate opinion.
500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015
(1974).
21 500 F.2d at 928.
22 550 F.2d at 92 (quoting United States ex rel. Johnson v. Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,
928 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974)).
21 550 F.2d at 92-93. In reaching this determination, the majority relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), which indicated that the nature
of the interests involved is determinative of whether due process protection is required. See
note 56 infra. The Second Circuit found that New York law gives rise to a "'justifiable
expectation'" that prisoners will be released if parole board standards are met. 550 F.2d at
92 (citation omitted).
21 550 F.2d at 93 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). In Mathews, the
Supreme Court held that due process does not require a formal hearing prior to the discontin-
uation of Social Security disability payments. 424 U.S. at 349. This conclusion was based in
part on the extensive procedural protection built into the Social Security System. The Su-
preme Court summarized these procedures as follows:
If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state agency and the determina-
tion is adverse, the SSA reviews the reconsideration determination and notifies the
recipient of the decision. He then has a right to an evidentiary hearing before an
SSA administrative law judge. The hearing is nonadversary, and the SSA is not
represented by counsel. As at all prior and subsequent stages of the administrative
process, however, the claimant . . . is entitled to request discretionary review by
the SSA Appeals Council, and finally may obtain judicial review.
Should it be determined at any point after termination of benefits, that the
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conditional release and the potential parolee, 2 the Zurak court
found that the likelihood of obtaining conditional release is not as
strong as the possibility of obtaining parole.26 The conditional re-
lease applicant, moreover, will be serving a shorter sentence than
the applicant for parole.? Judge Lumbard therefore intimated that
the inmate's interest in conditional release is "less substantial"
than that in parole release and requires less due process protection. 28
Against this backdrop, the Second Circuit evaluated the spe-
cific procedural requirements imposed by the district court. Judge
Lumbard noted that the essence of due process is "the opportunity
to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' ",29
Accordingly, the Zurak panel upheld that portion of the lower court
order requiring that conditional release applicants "be processed in
order of eligibility and within 60-90 days of an inmate's arrival" at
Rikers Island."0 Observing that, in general, applications are cur-
rently processed within such time limits," the court reasoned that
claimant's disability extended beyond the date of cessation initially established,
the worker is entitled to retroactive payments.
Id. at 339 (citations omitted).
550 F.2d at 93. Judge Lumbard, in distinguishing parole from conditional release,
relied upon the distinction previously drawn by the Supreme Court between a prisoner's
interest in the parole release and parole revocation decision-making processes. Id. See Morris-
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), where the Supreme Court stated: "It is not sophistic to
attach greater importance to a person's justifiable reliance in maintaining his conditional
freedom so long as he abides by the conditions of his release, than to his mere anticipation
or hope of freedom." Id. at 482 n.8 (quoting United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of
Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir. 1971)). Another factor differentiating parole release from
parole revocation is the wide discretionary authority afforded the parole board in granting
parole, which is not present in the revocation process. 550 F.2d at 93. Such broad discretion
"necessarily lessens the required content of due process." Id.
26 550 F.2d at 93. The court noted that board statistics indicated that in 1972 75.4% of
parole applicants were successful as opposed to 1974 statistics which indicated that only 29%
of conditional release applications were approved. Id. at 93 n.12.
Id. at 86. The plaintiffs contended that the consequences of being denied conditional
release actually are similar to the consequences of being denied parole. The plaintiffs pointed
out that an inmate serving the longest definite sentence, 2 years, is eligible for conditional
release after 60 days, while an inmate serving the shortest indeterminate sentence, 3 years,
may obtain parole after 1 year. Under these circumstances a prisoner denied parole at his
original eligibility date will serve an additional 24 months, and an individual refused condi-
tional release will serve an additional 22 months, a differential of only 2 months. Relying upon
these calculations, the plaintiffs concluded that prisoners in both situations have similar
interests. The court dismissed this argument, finding the calculations based upon a rare
situation not demonstrative of the majority of cases. Id. at 93 n.13.
2- Id. at 93.
2 Id. at 94 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
1 550 F.2d at 94. The court found it necessary to qualify the time limitations it pre-
scribed, stating that the guidelines are to be applied only to the extent that fairness and
practicality so permit. Id.
31 Id.
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adherence to this requirement would not place an undue burden on
the state.32 As to the district court's direction that an inmate be
furnished with a statement of reasons and facts if his application for
conditional release is denied, the Second Circuit determined that
such a procedure is necessary to protect against arbitrary and capri-
cious decisions by the parole board.3 3 Judge Lumbard held, however,
that in light of the short span of time between a prisoner's arrival
and the conditional release decision, as well as the nonadversary
nature of conditional release proceedings, 34 due process does not
require that a conditional release applicant be permitted a personal
appearance before the board.35 Pointing to the substantial monetary
and administrative strain that would be placed on the state if a
personal appearance were mandatory, the Second Circuit panel con-
cluded that the statement of reasons and facts provided to the in-
mate, coupled with the availability of judicial review, will be suffi-
cient to insulate the conditional release applicant from inequitable
decisions.
Judge Van Graafeiland strenuously dissented from that portion
of the panel's opinion which held that conditional release applicants
must be processed in order of eligibility and within designated time
limits.37 The dissent was of the opinion that a judicially imposed
regimentation of the release process would constitute an unwar-
ranted extension of federal authority into an area of overriding state
concern. In addition, Judge Van Graafeiland suggested that the
majority's order-of-processing directive could lead to the inequita-
12 Id. at 95-96.
1 Id. at 95. Although the parole board has been voluntarily issuing a statement of reasons
to inmates since 1975, the court, relying upon Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 810-11 (1974),
stated that this "voluntary compliance does not make [the] controversy moot." 550 F.2d at
95 n.17.
" The court noted that in conditional release hearings, unlike parole revocation hearings,
both the parole board and the prisoner have an "interest in obtaining the inmate's release."
550 F.2d at 95 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973)).
550 F.2d at 96.
Id. Relying upon Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974) and Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the Second Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
affording greater procedural protection to potential parolees than conditional release appli-
cants is violative of the equal protection clause. 550 F.2d at 96. The Zurak court found that
since parole applicants are serving longer sentences than conditional release applicants, there
exists a rational basis for certain distinctions in treatment. Id. at 93.
550 F.2d at 97 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
' Id. (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). Judge Van Graafeiland believed that the major-
ity, by intimately involving itself with the administration of New York prisons, ignored the
Supreme Court's warning that "federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons, the
administration of which is of acute interest to the states." Id. at 97 (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)).
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ble treatment of many inmates.39 It was Judge Van Graafeiland's
belief that such a requirement would delay the release of an inmate
who promptly filed his request, as prisoners who filed at a later time
but had earlier eligibility dates would be given administrative prior-
ity.40
The Second Circuit holding in Zurak appears to be an extension
of its earlier decision in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Board of
Parole." Johnson was the first decision of a federal court of appeals
holding that a prisoner's interest in parole release is within the
ambit of the due process clause. 4 The Johnson court drew support
from the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer,43 a case
which mandated that certain due process safeguards be provided in
the parole revocation process.4 4 Although the Morrissey Court sug-
gested, in dicta, that it might be possible to distinguish the interests
at stake in parole revocation from those involved in parole release,4 5
31 550 F.2d at 97 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
10 Id. (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
JI 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015
(1974).
42 Shortly after Johnson was decided, the District of Columbia Circuit in Childs v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and the Fourth Circuit in Bradford
v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) extended
due process protection to the parole release applicant.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
" See notes 3 & 4 supra. The Morrissey Court held that two hearings are required prior
to the revocation of parole, one at the time of arrest and another at the time parole is officially
revoked. In addition, upon the formal revocation of parole, the following safeguards are
required: the individual must be supplied with a written statement of his alleged violations
and informed of the evidence to be used against him; he is to be afforded an opportunity to
appear personally before the parole board and establish a defense, at which time he may
present oral or written evidence and examine adverse witnesses; the parolee is entitled to a
hearing before a neutral and detached administrative body; and upon the revocation of
parole, the individual must be furnished a written statement delineating the reasons for and
the evidence employed in rendering the decision. 408 U.S. at 489. For a discussion of
Morrissey, see Cohn, A Comment on Morrissey v. Brewer: Due Process and Parole
Revocation, 8 CiaM. L. BuLL. 616, 619-21 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Right to
Hearing at Parole Revocation, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 95 (1972).
'1 408 U.S. at 482. The Morrissey Court noted that an individual released on parole is in
a very different situation than an inmate in prison. Id. at 482 n.8 (citing United States ex
rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir. 1971)).
The question whether due process protection must be provided in the initial parole
release process has frequently been presented to the Supreme Court, but the Court has
consistently remanded the cases for consideration of mootness. See Scott v. Kentucky Bd.
of Parole, 429 U.S. 60 (1976) (per curiam); Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Scarpa
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 414 U.S. 809 (1974). In Scott a prisoner claimed that his
constitutional right to due process was violated by the parole board's failure to provide him
with minimum procedural safeguards. The prisoner had been granted parole by the time the
case reached the Supreme Court, and for this reason the action was dismissed as moot. Three
justices vigorously dissented, finding that the issue was not moot, since the paroled prisoner
1978] SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1976 TERM
the Second Circuit in Johnson rejected such a distinction, charac-
terizing it as "too gossamer-thin to stand close analysis."46
The circuits which have considered the parole release issue sub-
sequent to Johnson have been divided." The Fifth Circuit has tac-
itly rejected Morrissey as a basis for extending constitutional pro-
tection to the parole granting process." That court distinguished
parole revocation from parole release, noting that a presently en-
joyed interest is involved only in the revocation of parole.49 Reason-
ing that this present-future dichotomy is determinative of whether
an interest is entitled to due process protection, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that such protection should not attach to the parole re-
lease process. 0 A clear majority of the circuits which have addressed
would continue to be under the supervision of parole officials. Mr. Justice Stevens stated that
resolution of the due process issue is "extremely important" due to the large number of
decisions parole boards must render each year, the grave ramifications of such decisions on
prisoners, and the divergence of opinion among the circuits on the question. Noting that the
Court has had a number of opportunities to resolve this issue but on each occasion has
remanded the case for mootness, Mr. Justice Stevens concluded: "A suggestion of mootness
which this Court can readily decide should not be permitted to have such far-reaching conse-
quences." 429 U.S. at 64.
11 500 F.2d at 928. In reference to decisions which had denied due process protection to
parole applicants, see note 3 supra, the Johnson court stated: "In our view Morrissey not only
cast grave doubt upon these decisions but, more important for present purposes, rejected the
concept that due process might be denied in parole proceedings on the grounds that parole
was a 'privilege' rather than a 'right.'" 500 F.2d at 927.
"7 In Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976), the
Fifth Circuit held that due process protection does not apply to the initial parole release
process. The court reasoned that since the prisoner is still in legal custody at the time of the
parole board's determination, there is only a "mere expectation interest involved and not a
present liberty or property interest." 528 F.2d at 1053. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Brown
is consistent with its earlier holdings in Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278
(5th Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded as moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973) and Sexton v. Wise,
494 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit in Scott v. Kentucky Bd. of Parole, No. 74-
1899 (6th Cir. January 15, 1975), vacated and remanded as moot, 429 U.S. 60 (1976) (per
curiam), employed a similar rationale in holding that a prisoner's interest in the parole
process is not within the scope of the due process clause.
The Fourth Circuit, however, in Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974),
vacated as moot, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) held that due process attaches to the parole release
process. 519 F.2d at 733. In reaching its decision, the Bradford court relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), which required that procedural
safeguards be afforded a prisoner whose good-time credit is revoked. In accord with the
Second and Fourth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff,
525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914 (1976) and the District of Columbia
Circuit in Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974) held that
due process requires that a statement of reasons be given prisoners upon the denial of parole.
See generally 44 CiN. L. REv. 115 (1975); 27 VAND. L. Rxv. 1257 (1974).
" See Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 & n.17 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
" 477 F.2d at 282 & n.17.
50 Id. at 283. The Scarpa court stated: "It may be that Congress in its legislative wisdom
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the issue, however, have held that an inmate's expectation of parole
release is sufficient to require due process protection even though no
present liberty interest is at stake." These latter decisions, unlike
the position of the Fifth Circuit, are consonant with recent Supreme
Court authority indicating that due process requirements attach
even where only a future interest is involved. 52
will see fit to adopt the procedures here urged, but this we refuse to do by judicial fiat based
on some theory of justification through constitutional compulsion." Id.
It is suggested that the Fifth Circuit's present interest-future interest dichtomy is remi-
niscent of the now discredited right-privilege distinction. See Scarpa v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded as moot, 414 U.S.
809 (1973). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that "this Court
now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental
benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' "Id. at 481 (quoting Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)). The notion that constitutional safeguards may be denied on
the ground that the interest at stake is a privilege and not a right is exemplified by the
decision in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), in which
the plaintiff, a policeman, alleged that his right to free speech was violated by his employer.
Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, stated: "The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman." Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
The characterization of parole release as a privilege not entitled to due process protection
is traceable to dictum appearing in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935). In Escoe, a prisoner's
probation was revoked without a prior hearing. The inmate thereupon filed for habeas corpus
relief, claiming that his continuing incarceration violated the due process clause. Although
the Court found a hearing was required under the relevant statutory provisions, Mr. Justice
Cardozo stated:
In thus holding we do not accept the petitioner's contention that the privilege
has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute. Probation or suspension of
sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled
with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose.
Id. at 492-93. For an in-depth discussion of the right-privilege distinction, see Van Alystne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439
(1968).
11 See United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 914 (1976) (justifiable expectation interest creates need for due process protection);
Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 423 U.S. 147 (1975)
(due process attaches even though there is no present liberty interest at stake); Childs v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (due process protection attaches
to the parole board's decision since the government has created a justifiable expectation
interest); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated
as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974) (minimum due process protection
attaches to the initial parole release process since the prisoner has a justifiable expectation
of being released); cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). In Meachum, the Supreme
Court held that a prisoner is not entitled to due process safeguards prior to being transferred
from one prison to another, less favorable institution. Finding no liberty interest of the
prisoner involved, id. at 225, the Court stated that "[w]e reject at the outset the notion that
any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural
protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 224 (emphasis in original).
1, See Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). In Willner, the petitioner,
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Viewed in light of Johnson and its progeny, the Second Circuit's
extension of due process protection to conditional release applicants
appears sound. The only significant difference between the parole
release and the conditional release situation is the length of the
inmate's initial sentence. 3 In both instances, the prisoner nonethe-
less has an interest in obtaining conditional freedom. Since due
process of law is required before an individual may be deprived of
any non-de-minimis interest,54 irrespective of the length and signifi-
cance of the threatened deprivation,55 the applicant for conditional
release, like the potential parolee, should be afforded some measure
of constitutional protection.
Having determined that the conditional release procedure is
an applicant to the New York State Bar, was denied admission thereto based on his past
activities. He was not afforded a hearing by the bar examiners or permitted to confront
adverse witnesses. Although the New York statute appeared to grant absolute discretion to
the bar examiners, the Supreme Court held that due process requires a hearing before an
applicant is denied admission to the bar. Id. at 106. It would appear that an application of
the nonpresent interest test in Willner would have led to the conclusion that due process does
not require such a hearing, since the only interest involved is a future one, i.e., the future
practice of law. By holding that due process is applicable, however, the Supreme Court
appears to have concluded that it is the nature of the interest and not the time of its
enjoyment that is controlling. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (nature of the
interest determines whether due process applies).
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975). In Goss, students who were suspended
from school for 10 days without a hearing contended their right to due process was violated.
The school argued a 10-day period was not serious enough to require a hearing. In holding
that due process attached to the suspension, the Court stated: "[Tihe length and consequent
severity of a deprivation, while another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form
of hearing, is not decisive of the basic right to a hearing of some kind." Id. In Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) the constitutionality of a Florida replevin statute which permitted
a creditor to obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin and seize a debtor's property without a
prior hearing was challenged. Although the property could be retrieved within 3 days by
posting bond for double the value of the property, theCourt held the statute unconstitutional
stating:
The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day
or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property by the State
is within the purview of the Due Process Clause. While the length and consequent
severity of a deprivation may be another factor to weigh in determining the appro-
priate form of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing of some
kind.
Id. at 86.
"' See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
570 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-379 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). Conditional release is certainly not
considered a de minimis interest by the applicant. As the Commission on Attica found: "By
1971 conditional release and parole had become by far the greatest source of inmate anxiety
and frustration. . . .There were very few inmates interviewed by the Commission who did
not list parole and 'CR' [conditional release] among their chief grievances." NEW YORK
STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTnCA-OFFIcL4L REPORT ON ATTICA 91-92 (1972).
11 550 F.2d at 96.
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subject to due process limitations, the Second Circuit was con-
fronted with the task of identifying those safeguards necessary to
bring the procedure in line with constitutional requirements. The
court refused to order that applicants be provided a prerelease
hearing, but instead directed that they be processed in order of
eligibility, within a delineated time period, and afforded a state-
ment of reasons upon denial of conditional release.56 It is submitted
that, in so doing, the Zurak panel has denied conditional release
applicants an effective opportunity to be heard. The safeguards
required by the due process clause vary greatly, depending upon the
interest at stake in a particular proceeding." Generally, the minimal
requirment is the right to a hearing prior to the deprivation of a
protected interest,58 but under certain limited circumstances a prior
formal hearing may be unnecessary.59 At a minimum, however, the
procedural safeguards imposed must ensure protection from arbi-
trary and capricious governmental deprivation of the interest in-
volved.6" The individual, therefore, may not be denied an
"' See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) wherein the Court stated: "Due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Id.
at 481; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
" See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970);
accord, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
The Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), has stated: "The analysis as to
liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has consistently
held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of
his property interests." Id. at 557-58. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Supreme
Court held that a hearing is required prior to terminating welfare benefits even though the
recipient is afforded: 1) a statement of reasons for the discontinuation of payments; 2) a right
to appeal and an opportunity to submit statements as to why his benefits should not be
discontinued; 3) the right to elect a hearing after termination of payments; 4) all back
payments if it is later held that the benefits were unjustifiably discontinued. The Court found
constitutionally insufficient the oppportunity afforded the recipient to present his case in
writing or through a caseworker, id. at 269, reasoning that written statements are not an
adequate safeguard in light of the lack of education on the part of many recipients. Id. It is
suggested that a large number of inmates suffer from this disability. Surveys have revealed
that in New York State approximately 80% of those incarcerated never graduated from high
school, and 15% to 50% could be classified as functionally illiterate. NEw YORK STATE COMMIS-
SION OF INVESTIGATIONS, REPORT ON COUNTY JAILS AND PENITENTIARIES IN NEW YORK 37 (1966).
- See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (hearing after termination of social
security disability benefits held sufficient to meet due process requirements); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (creditor may obtain writ of sequestration for goods
without prior hearing when provision is made for automatic hearing after confiscation of
goods, and security is placed with court).
"' See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
o See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). As the Fuentes Court stated: "For more
than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose
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"opportunity to be heard"'" at a time when a hearing can be useful
in protecting his interests from unjustifiable governmental interfer-
ence. 2 This basic principle of procedural protection has been ap-
plied even in instances where the liberty interest at issue is condi-
tional in nature 3
In denying the plaintiffs the right to a hearing before the parole
board, the Second Circuit reasoned that judicial review would be
available to ensure that arbitrary determinations are not rendered
by the board. 4 The effectiveness of such judicial review, however,
is cast in serious doubt by the court's own recognition that an in-
mate is not likely to obtain court intervention while still incarcer-
ated.65 The absence of an opportunity for the prisoner to be heard
in his defense is apparent in this situation. While the Zurak decision
provides an avenue of communication from the parole board to the
prisoner via the statement of reasons upon denial, there is no provi-
sion made for the prisoner to transmit information to the board.6
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard. . . .' "Id. at 80 (quoting Baldwin v. Hale,
68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)); accord, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970); Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
61 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
12 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(due process protection applies to an individual's interest in probation and a hearing is
required); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (individual released on parole entitled to
hearing before parole may be revoked, even though the liberty interest involved is conditioned
on meeting the criteria established by the parole board).
550 F.2d at 96.
8I Id. at 92. As the Zurak court stated: "Because of the relatively short periods of incar-
ceration involved and the possibility of conditional release, the alleged harm can hardly be
redressed while any possible plaintiff is still an inmate." Id.
85 The importance of a hearing has been noted by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring
opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring):
Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender
an assurance of rightness. No better instrument has been devised for arriving at
truth than to give a person in jeopardy a serious loss notice of the case against him
and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.
Id. at 171-72.
88 Congress has laid down the requirement that a federal prisoner be provided an oppor-
tunity for a hearing upon the denial of parole. See 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1969 & Supp. 1977).
The Senate report underlying this legislation stated: "It is essential, then, that parole has
both the fact and appearance of fairness to all. Nothing less is necessary for the maintenance
of the integrity of our criminal justice institutions." [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
340. The Model Penal Code also provided for a hearing upon the denial of parole. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 305.6 (1974). The drafters of that Code were of the opinion that "[tihere can
be no real question of the desirability of providing a hearing to the prisoner. Indeed, it is
essential if he is to believe in the fairness of the system of granting paroles." Id. § 305.10,
comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). In addition, New York provides for a hearing for parole
applicants. See N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 214 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1977-1978).
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The financial burden that must be borne to implement such a pro-
cedure, while an important aspect to be considered, should not be
dispositive of the question whether adequate protection is being
afforded conditional release applicants. 7 In calculating the mone-
tary burden that would be placed on the state by implementing a
hearing procedure, consideration must be given to the fact that
incarceration is by far the most expensive form of state supervi-
sion.18 If by virtue of the added due process protection inmates who
might unjustifiably be denied release were granted conditional re-
lease, the financial outlay would be reduced to some extent.
Nevertheless, the procedures mandated by the Second Circuit
should have the effect of making the conditional release process
more efficient. This increased efficiency will be reflected in the elim-
ination of the heretofore existing 6-month waiting period for the
board to reach a decision. 9 In addition, these requirements should
rectify the past practice of the parole board in failing to schedule
required interviews for as long as 8 months after arrival at Rikers
Island. In the final analysis, since due process is such a flexible
concept, it is difficult to determine with any degree of certainty the
procedures necessary to ensure adequate, or even minimal, protec-
tion under any given set of circumstances. Although perhaps not
extending all safeguards necessary to assure adequate protection of
an inmate's expectation interest in conditional release, the Second
Circuit's decision in Zurak has further advanced the rights of state
prisoners, an advancement which few other jurisdictions have recog-
nized to date.
Vincent J. LaGreca
" In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court stated: "While the problem of
additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the
ordinary standards of due process." Id. at 261.
As of 1964, the cost of keeping an individual incarcerated was seven dollars per day.
In contrast, it costs only one dollar per day to supervise an individual on conditional release.
TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND CmMINAL CODE, PROPOSED
NEw YORK PENAL LAW § 30.40 (1964).
'g See 550 F.2d at 90 n.5.
7o See id.
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